Innovation-Based Competition and the Dynamics of Design in Upstream Suppliers by Lenfle, Sylvain & Midler, Christophe
Innovation-Based Competition and the Dynamics of
Design in Upstream Suppliers
Sylvain Lenfle, Christophe Midler
To cite this version:
Sylvain Lenfle, Christophe Midler. Innovation-Based Competition and the Dynamics of Design
in Upstream Suppliers. International Journal of Automotive Technology et Management, 2001,
2/3 (Sp. Iss), pp.269-286. <hal-00262522>
HAL Id: hal-00262522
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00262522
Submitted on 8 Apr 2008
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 - 1 - 
 





Université de Cergy Pontoise & 
Centre de Recherche en Gestion – Ecole Polytechnique 
1, rue Descartes 
75005 Paris 
 
 & Christophe Midler 
Director of Research - CNRS 
Centre de Recherche en Gestion – Ecole Polytechnique 
1, rue Descartes 
75005 Paris 
 





 Although the evolution of the design process in car manufacturers and their first-tier 
suppliers has been studied extensively, the situation is different for upstream industries, 
usually chemical and steel firms. This article focuses on such upstream suppliers situation 
based on an interactive research with a major european steel-maker group, Usinor.  
In its first part, it demonstrate that innovation-based competition is a significant issue 
for companies situated upstream from end-product manufacturers. The accelerating pace of 
the (re)design of end products downstream is increasing opportunities for the substitution of 
raw materials. The importance of this issue is obscured, however, by considerable inertia in 
the spread of innovations through the sector.  
Then the article characterises the specificities of implementing an innovative design 
strategy due to the activity and position of the firm in the industrial chain. The conclusions 
will make it clear that design models developed for car-manufacturers and first tear suppliers 
are in many ways unsuitable for this different context. We finally propose 5 principles to 
evaluate and define a innovation management system in upstream suppliers.  
 
Key words : innovation, management, design organisation, steel industry. 
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Although the evolution of the design process in car manufacturers and their first-tier 
suppliers has been studied extensively, the situation is different for upstream industries, 
usually chemical and steel firms. At this level, how extensive are the repercussions of 
innovation-based competition, which is so important on markets for end products? Are the 
new design models being developed by manufacturers suitable for the specific situation of 
upstream companies ? If not, is it possible to formulate a specific design model for upstream 
firms, and what is its relationship to previous models? 
 
 To answer these questions, two studies were carried out with typical upstream firms: the 
chemical and pharmaceutical company Rhône-Poulenc (Charue-Duboc, 1997, 1998, Charue-
Duboc et Midler, 1998) and the steel-maker Usinor. This article is based on the second study 
which is going on since 1997. 
 First, an in-depth ex post analysis was made of several projects. Then, in real time, we 
took part in a major on-going project, in order to test the new methods and tools developed 
for these situations. 
 
The main themes we will develop in this article are: 
- Innovation-based competition at the level of end products is also a significant issue for 
companies situated upstream from end-product manufacturers. The accelerating pace of 
the more or less radical (re)design of end products downstream is increasing opportunities 
for the substitution of raw materials, as part of the never-ending search for compromises. 
The importance of this issue is obscured, however, by considerable inertia in the spread of 
innovations through the sector (concept of the endangered dominant firm, Boudès, 1997). 
- Implementing an innovative design strategy poses problems that are specific to the 
activity and position of the firm in the industrial chain. Our analysis of these 
characteristics of innovative upstream solutions will make it clear that design models 
developed in manufacturing are in many ways unsuitable for this different context. 
- Finally, we propose 5 principles to evaluate and define a innovation management system 
in upstream suppliers. These principles are supporting the ongoing experiments in Usinor 
on a major innovative project of the firm. A key point is accelerating and guiding the 
process of acquiring knowledge about upstream innovative solutions. 
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1. The importance of innovation-based competition for upstream industries: the 
example of the steel industry 
 
 This section will show that innovation-based competition does not affect the 
manufacturing sector alone. On the contrary, upstream firms are also required to innovate, 
notably through pressure from the manufacturers themselves. Yet, as we shall see, the 
position of upstream firms in the industrial chain and developments in their customers’ design 
processes put them in a vulnerable situation of “hidden urgency”. 
1.1. Innovation against the slow erosion of a dominant position 
 
  The “innovation imperative” for firms like Usinor is rooted in the combination of two 
trends. 
First, the rise of competition from the newly industrialized countries is eroding the 
traditional advantages of Western firms (technological monopoly on “major processes”, the 
impact of size, etc.). This pushes such firms to concentrate on high value-added products, a 
strategy that requires a capacity for constant innovation. The case of Usinor is especially 
typical of this trend, as the firm has steadily moved away from “standard” activities 
(particularly long products) to focus on high value-added steels (carbon steel plate and 
stainless steels), which are more profitable.  
Second, manufacturing firms are constantly widening their search for breakthroughs 
that would enable them to develop more competitive products, which leads them to call the 
use of traditional materials into question. To stay with the example of Usinor, steel is the 
basic material par excellence on the company’s main market1, automobiles. Steel accounts for 
55% of a car’s total weight. Its success is due to its mechanical properties, its low cost 
(compared to potential substitutes like plastics and aluminium) and the considerable existing 
investment and know-how accumulated over decades of experience. However, this situation 
could change in the coming years due to the growing importance of reduced weight. On the 
one hand, higher safety standards and the increasing sophistication of cars have led to a 
steady increase in cars’ weight over the last few years. On the other, government anti-
pollution standards2 entail the lightening of vehicles (or the acceptance of poorer 
performance, which is not easy in today’s markets). These two trends are encouraging radical 
changes in the design of the next generation of cars, which could challenge existing 
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compromises and technical solutions. This might well leave steel in a much weaker position 
in some of its most profitable market segments. The increasing use of substitute materials is 
already apparent on some cars, and this trend should continue: aluminium (body, doors and 
boot), plastics (fenders3, floors), magnesium (body parts, seats, dashboard, etc.), and so on. 
To counter this process of erosion, the steel maker must make substantial outlays for 
research in order to offer ever more effective solutions. This research should involve not only 
the products themselves (high-strength steels, coated steels, TRIP steels, tailored blanks4, 
etc.) but also their implementation (forming and assembly) and even software that enables the 
automobile designer to find an optimum “steel solution” to meet the specifications of a piece 
or a function. 
We should emphasize the difficulties of this strategic situation, where increased outlays 
for innovation are due not to the prospect of solid growth (as, for example, in other recent 
examples like personal computing and the Internet) but to the necessity for halting a decline 
that would otherwise be inevitable. 
1.2. The hidden urgency of innovation in endangered dominant firms 
 
 Another difficulty affecting innovation in this area is related to the significant inertia 
in the design chain between the decision to apply an innovation in materials and the product’s 
appearance on the market. One consequence of the new development approach of 
downstream manufacturers is to limit as much as possible any uncertainties associated with 
breakthrough technical innovations in the course of developing a new product. Deadlines for 
the upstream supplier are thus shortened, while the real economic impact of these decisions is 
still very distant. Thus, given the leadtimes inherent in manufacturers’ design processes, 
technical choices for vehicles to be produced in 2004 are being made at the end of 1999. If 
innovations are not sufficiently advanced to interest the customers in this very narrow “target 
window”, an entire generation of vehicle manufacturing will be lost, with the risk of making 
the situation irreversible5.  
 The problem is thus one of mobilization and incentive to deploy the effort needed to 
meet an urgent strategic need when the actual economic returns are so remote. The 
importance of speed, a feeling of urgency and the risks of the situation stand out more clearly 
in other contexts where design cycles are shorter. Here there is no question of “reacting to a 
market stimulus”, because such reactions will already be much too late. The same problem 
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can be seen in the pharmaceutical industry: competitive advantage can depend on a difference 
of a single week in submitting a patent application, while the products will be marketed at 
least ten years later! The difficulty in grasping the urgency is heightened when, as here, the 
company is in a dominant position (Boudès, 1997) and when the exploration of potential 
breakthroughs diverges from solutions envisaged by the company in the short term. 
 
 Innovation is thus an imperative for upstream firms as well, even if this is less 
apparent than in the manufactured goods sector. This does not, however, imply that the 
organizational solutions that come to dominate product design in sectors such as automobiles 
and electronics are adaptable or relevant to the upstream context. The next section describes 
the specific features of a strategy for innovative upstream services. We will also discuss the 
relevance and limits of organizational forms for design that have been developed recently in 
other contexts. In the final section, we will outline a method for managing a project portfolio 
for innovative upstream goods and services that takes these specific features into account. 
 
2. The specific features of managing strategies for innovative market supply in the 
situation of upstream firms 
 
In this section we will describe what is involved in supplying innovative goods and 
services in the context of upstream firms. Five specific features stand out, which we will 
compare with the situation of managing new products in the manufacturing industry: defining 
the scope of the innovation process; pushing technological innovations into the value chain in 
the search for markets; the number and size of projects; a strategically complex situation; and 
a high level of uncertainty. We will study the problems each of these poses for the 
transposition of the most widely used project-management models to the case of upstream 
firms. 
2.1. The complexity of defining innovative upstream solutions  
 
The first specificity relates to the very nature of the firm’s activity. In manufacturing, 
the design process has a clear, though not necessarily simple, end result: a new, tangible 
product with an identifiable performance and sales, such as a line of cars, a bridge, an 
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aeroplane, etc. In the case of upstream companies, however, the outcome of the innovative 
process is more difficult to define. 
In the recent period, one of the main strategic approaches of big upstream firms like 
Usinor has been, as we have seen, to abandon this concrete definition of their economic 
activity (which would make them mere “sellers of tonnes of steel”) and replace it with a 
definition involving comprehensive service supply to downstream industrial customers, i.e. 
offering a “steel solution” (Benghozi, 1999). This refers to the firm’s capacity to mobilize an 
in-house knowledge base and capacity to attack a problem which is functionally defined by 
the customer, such as designing a steel auto body part able to absorb the impact of a frontal 
shock, to support certain mechanical parts and to absorb certain vibrations, within given 
limits on space, weight and cost. The same evolution has taken place in the world of 
chemicals, with the change in Rhône-Poulenc’s strategy from commodities-oriented 
chemistry to chemistry based on function or “use value” (Charue-Duboc 1998): the actual 
steel or chemical product sold is secondary to its function in the specific assembly 
manufactured by the customer for integration into the end product. 
 
This redefinition of firms’ activity, the economic rationale for which is examined above, 
raises problems when we try to define a policy for innovative market supply, for two reasons. 
- First, it considerably expands the scope of the work involved in developing an innovation. 
Consider a project for the automobile market that we have been involved in for three 
years: the development of hydroforming, a new forming process6. In this example, a 
narrow vision of the project would involve producing samples and would end with the 
entry of the corresponding products into the catalogue, leaving it up to the customers to 
define and develop any applications. With a broader view of the firm’s vocation, the 
project should take responsibility, together with the customer, for the application aspect, 
and hence for defining services associated with the use of the new material or process 
(and thus supplying the entire design and manufacturing process for a part using the 
innovation). 
- Second, the broad scope involved in innovative market supply, and thus the outcome of 
innovation projects themselves, are difficult to define. On the one hand, the project is 
closely linked with applications developed by the customers, such as supply of a piece of 
hydroformed tube, to continue our example. The value of the project for the upstream firm 
would thus be defined by the sales generated by the steel in this piece. On the other hand, 
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producing a single piece is not an end in itself for this kind of project. Rather, the goal 
should be to supply a generic process-material solution, less contextualized than the piece 
itself – a “generic solution”, “proven concept” or “semi-product” (Weil, 1999) that can be 
quickly applied to the design of other applications. Without this perspective, the 
investments required would not be profitable. As a result of this goal of standardization 
and the inertia of the process, the total sales figure gives only a very incomplete picture of 
the project’s achievements.  
 
It is well known that clear perception of the potential gain from projects to design new 
products, undertaken with a view to actual production of the product at a given date and with 
given resources, is a powerful motor for energizing development projects. However, 
management of the design of upstream products cannot count on this mechanism due to the 
relatively abstract and diffuse character of the results and the stakes involved. 
2.2. Technological innovations “pushed” into the value chain in search for markets 
 
Innovation results when a potential need finds a response, generally based on the use 
of a new technology. The initial contribution of the upstream firm in this process is obviously 
based on its knowledge of the relevant materials and technologies. Exploration of the 
technical aspect can thus be handled within the firm. In contrast, a detailed awareness of the 
functional specifications that are of value on the market for end products essentially falls 
within the purview of the chain of downstream customers that process the supplied raw 
material, even though companies like Usinor have significantly developed their capacities in 
this area. This detailed awareness of needs is clearly crucial to designing an innovative 
“materials solution”. Continuing with our example, Usinor could carry out an in-house study 
of the technical feasibility of a hydroformed part, but it is the auto makers who follow all 
developments in vehicle manufacturing, who thus can determine the parts for which these 
technologies might have advantages over existing technologies, and who can precisely define 
whatever specifications must be met. This involves determining the compromises needed 
among specifications that are usually not convergent and anticipating the direction and pace 
of changes in expectations based on the potential moves of other materials competitors in 
order to determine the performance required. Access to this knowledge is thus essential if the 
upstream firm’s research is to be more than a blind trial-and-error process. This is the reason 
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for the rising importance of occupational specialities involved in the search and the 
codification of this knowledge (Charue-Duboc, 1998), and for the involvement of customers 
in these projects. 
One of the difficulties of this strategy for chemical and steel-making firms is that, 
unlike manufacturing firms, they are often situated very far from the end user, frequently 
separated by several stages of materials processing and distribution. This has two 
consequences. 
- First, the “customer system” whose choices need to be understood is complex, as it must 
integrate all the processing stages up to the end product. This amounts to an organization 
or even an organizational complex7. For a hydroformed item, for example, it is necessary 
to take into account not only the engineers who designed the vehicle parts, but also the 
designers, methods, welders, paint, etc. If the item is made by a supplier (as is usually the 
case for components like exhaust lines, tanks, etc.), the supplier’s situation must also be 
integrated. It is necessary to understand the needs and constraints of each actor in the 
process. 
- Second, setting up co-design partnerships is more difficult for upstream firms than 
downstream ones. In the manufacturing sector, the initiative for “design revolutions” 
comes from the end firms in the chain. They are able to compel their suppliers to use a 
concurrent engineering approach by wielding their power as buyers. The situation is 
obviously different for upstream firms, as projects usually require co-ordinating 
downstream customers or specifiers rather than upstream suppliers. How can customers be 
convinced to take part, when, as is usually the case, it is not possible to exercise financial 
leverage over the downstream part of the chain?  
 
Bansard, Cova and Flipo (1992) answered this question by showing the importance of 
distinguishing among situations on the basis of who initiates the innovation process: the 
customer, by expressing a demand, or the supplier, by offering innovative goods and services. 
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Figure 1: the various configurations of initiative in customer-supplier co-design 
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Reaction 





















Source : adapted from Bansard, Cova and Flipo, 1992. 
 
Involving the customer will be relatively easy whenever the firm is in a situation 
corresponding to the first row of the figure 1, when the customer is motivated by an explicit 
need (situations I and III), whereas it will be more difficult for projects in situation II (the last 
situation being ignored because it does not lead to the development of an innovative process). 
In a study of automobile equipment makers, Lamming (1993) differentiated two strategies for 
the supplier (corresponding to the columns) in these situations, which he described as either 
“a loyal collaborator” or a “key partner”. The first corresponds a “customization” strategy 
driven by the customer (in terms of methodology, this involves adopting a design model 
suited to the customer’s specific approach; in terms of content, it involves specifically 
adopting the unique specifications of the customer for the component to be supplied). The 
second corresponds to a supply-side strategy based on technological product and process 
strategies (technical strategies for the component, economies of scale so as to reduce costs but 
limiting the differentiation offered to builders, etc.). The choice between these two strategies 
(Donada, 1998) and the organizational mechanisms needed to handle the continual tension are 
key to the effectiveness of the design model for first-tier suppliers (Kesseler, 1998). 
 
The strategies studied at Usinor and Rhône-Poulenc fall into the proactive categories 
of “key partners”. In this case, the ideal is to be situated in class III, where explorations of a 
need and a technical potential converge. Moreover, the existence of an expressed demand is 
often a significant criterion in formal tools for choosing projects. However, eliminating type-
II situations will have little chance of halting the erosion we have described. Innovation 
 - 11 - 
strategies are being implemented in a competitive environment. With regard to clear trends 
such as the lightening of vehicles, if competitors (e.g. aluminium firms) are able to develop 
interesting proposals before the customer has formulated a precise demand, these are likely to 
impact heavily on the way the customer formulates the problem, thus giving such competitors 
a head start. Anticipation is a key word in today’s competitive climate. Thus, starting from a 
situation in which the supplier is exploring and anticipating customers’ latent requirements 
(type II), the goal is rapidly to elicit an explicit demand that will then lead to co-designing 
(type III). 
2.3. A profusion of small emerging projects 
 
Whereas an auto maker handles several big development projects that are vital for its 
survival, a company like Usinor manages several dozen projects at a time. There are 
numerous outlets for the products of chemical and steel-making firms. A given steel will be 
used for automobiles, construction, household appliances, etc. Consequently, project 
management is characterized mainly by an abundance of innovation paths, and hence of 
projects.  
The large number of projects makes it difficult to implement “heavyweight” project 
management. It is easier to dedicate full-time experts to projects that reach a certain “critical 
mass”. When the company needs to manage several dozen projects, it is almost impossible to 
assign full-time personnel to each, whether project leaders or team members. In these 
circumstances it is not unusual to see the same person manage several projects and take part 
in the work of other teams, with predictable consequences for timetabling. In the majority of 
projects studied, project leaders combined a managerial post with the leadership of a project, 
or more often several projects. As a result, they were able to devote only 10% of their time to 
the project concerned, and other team members were in the same position. 
In this situation, the problem of choosing among projects is crucial, and this brings us 
back to the process of project portfolio management, which is the only means of obtaining a 
sufficient concentration of energy and resources (Cooper et al. 1998, Bayart et al 1999). 
2.4. Great strategic complexity 
 
This question of choosing projects is related to an a priori assessment of the potential 
gains. This is a matter of determining whether an idea for a product having use value for end 
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customers will result in a profit for the company. For several reasons, the answer is anything 
but easy. 
First, the novelty of the ideas makes forecasts risky (remember that, in the case of 
automobiles, this is occurring about five years before the end product is marketed, if we take 
into account the duration of both the upstream project and development by the customer).  
Second, competition is not stable. Many of the projects studied went through sharp 
turns due to strategic events, such as the sale or purchase of business, a joint venture that was 
blocked or was not planned from the outset of the project, etc. 
Finally, an understanding of the potential gain from a project depends on how well it 
fits the firm’s structure. On the one hand, the practice of attaching personnel to a central 
research unit is often criticized as cutting them off from the real situations of customers. On 
the other, attaching them to a customer- or product-based business unit has two 
disadvantages. First, an understanding of long-term issues is more tenuous at this level, which 
is accustomed to employing short-term, highly operational criteria. In the choice between 
mobilizing energy to produce and sell existing products, or mobilizing knowledge and 
expensive equipment to test tomorrow’s products, priority is usually given to immediate 
needs. Second, the potential gain from a project can be transversal, cutting across several 
markets. Without consolidation, the perception of the project’s importance can thus be diluted 
at different levels of the organization. 
2.5. Projects with a significant research aspect, and thus a high risk of being 
stopped 
 
Building a package is the chief characteristic of projects in the manufacturing sector. 
This generally involves capitalizing on existing scientific and technical research by 
selectively integrating the products of such research. Some learning must occur, particularly 
regarding knowledge of interfacing (Weil, 1999), but the level of uncertainty is nonetheless 
not dramatic. In contrast, the projects of the chemical and steel-making firms described here 
are typified by much more striking changes and unknowns. Technically, the transition from a 
stamped to a hydroformed part involves the entire design chain. It is necessary to determine 
whether its form can be achieved in the new material and to study its mechanical, acoustic, 
and ageing properties, as well as its reactions to the different processes that it must undergo. 
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Economically, there is significant uncertainty regarding costs, given a situation where the 
industrial scenarios exist only on paper. This high level of uncertainty has two consequences:  
- First, there is a much lower probability that such parts will ultimately find their way to the 
market for end products. This explains the culture of caution which has taken root in this 
situation. Given the lower likelihood that the product will ever be marketed, firms hesitate 
before undertaking more extensive research which, if unsuccessful, will be a lost 
investment. This culture makes it difficult to implement the principle of anticipation so 
omnipresent in the approach of modern design. This has all too familiar consequences, 
such as projects that spiral on and on; although they do not immediately use many 
resources, no-one knows whether they will eventually produce any results. Just how far is 
the principle of anticipation applicable, and how is it possible to break this vicious circle 
in which the likelihood of success remains low because no-one dares to anticipate? 
- Second, unlike a conventional development project, which largely amounts to the 
realization of an object and an industrial process, here the management of knowledge is 
dominant. A vast field covering potential outlets for the technology and its technical 
properties must be explored as fast and thoroughly as possible. The production of a part is 
thus only a partial result of the project and should be considered as helping to mark out 
the field of application of the new material, since the extent of this field is initially 
unknown. The effectiveness of project management is comparable to the effectiveness of 
the process of creating knowledge or learning. In this regard, the study of such processes 
should draw on work on the concepts of collective learning and knowledge management 
in organizations (Midler, Charue-Duboc, 1998, Nonaka et Takeuchi 1995, Lundin et 
Midler 1998, Hatchuel, 1999, Hatchuel et al.,1999). 
 
Given these five specific features, the model of concurrent engineering as it has developed 
in the manufacturing industry could be adopted only with great difficulty, even though its 
principles are generally relevant. The issue for current research is to develop a management 
model adapted to this particular situation. 
3. Towards a design model suitable for innovative upstream product supply 
 
This section concentrates on the characterization and management of projects for 
innovative product supply, which has been the focus of our current research at Usinor. 
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3.1.Defining the space for exploring projects for innovative upstream goods and 
services 
 
The notion of a project is polysemous and thus very ambiguous. Here, the term 
“projects for innovative goods and services” refers to projects with three characteristics: 
1) they are initiated by the supplier even when explicit customer demand does not 
necessarily exist (categories II and III of Table 1); 
2) instead of a single product, they propose generic concepts (target 
application/technical solution) upstream from development projects; 
3) as a result, they simultaneously explore the characteristics of the technical 
innovation and its potential applications and use value for the customer(s).  
 
A company like Usinor obviously deals with other types of projects (we are tempted to 
say “fortunately”, since the category under discussion is inherently problematic), including 
the improvement of existing products with no significant technical breakthroughs, the 
development of a new “steel solution” to meet a customer’s precise, explicit specifications 
(for example, a wheel with certain functional characteristics, a target cost, etc.), the launch of 
a new production line, etc.  However, in the current context of innovation-based competition, 
projects for innovative solutions are of crucial significance for a company’s future. 
 
A project for innovative goods and services is thus a space for exploration having, first, 
a technical aspect, and second, an applications aspect. To explore these two dimensions, the 
team will define and carry out physical tests and simulations while approaching clients to 
propose joint development of products incorporating the innovation. The project can thus be 
formalized as a series of experiments or studies making it possible to acquire knowledge 
about the innovation and, if the customer studies go well, eventually generating sales. The 
project team must thus build and traverse the space outlined in Figure 2 below.  
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Figure 2 : the project journey 
Field of knowledge to be 
explored  →  
 










Experiment 1      
Experiment 2   
 
   
…     … 
Customer A study      
Customer B study       
 
 The hydroforming project can be used to illustrate this design description. The firm’s 
interest in hydroforming began in 1994 following a one-off discussion with a customer in the 
automobile sector. A series of contacts (customers, exhibitions, competitive steel makers, 
press manufacturers, etc.) and articles in the trade press indicated that this could be a 
technique of the future for various industries, including automobile manufacturing, which is a 
key market for the firm. A study was thus launched to identify existing product world-wide, 
any a priori advantages of hydroforming, suppliers of presses, etc. Given the low level of 
technical knowledge on the subject, the company decided to invest in a hydroforming press. 
A project team was set up and given charge of developing this new procedure.  
 This is clearly a project for innovative goods and services. Indeed, once the press was 
installed, no customer really expressed a demand for this technique, although a few expressed 
interest. Similarly, the real potential of the procedure was unknown. The team’s task was thus 
to develop Usinor’s knowledge so that it was in a position to set specifications8 for a technical 
innovation and to offer steel solutions meeting the long-term requirements of its customer-
partners. The “result” of the project was indeed the generation of “generic” knowledge about 
hydroforming, knowledge that will make it possible to develop various specific applications. 
To achieve this kind of result, it is necessary to understand and master the technology 
while discovering its potential applications. The team should thus simultaneously define and 
carry out a research programme9 and contact customers to carry out joint studies10. The 
interaction between these two aspects will make it possible: 
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1. gradually to resolve technical uncertainties (what are the real possibilities of 
deformation? is the process truly robust? etc.);  
2. and to identify the most relevant applications (which items? with which functional 
characteristics? etc.). 
 
This challenges the traditional separation between research and development. 
Research is needed to determine relevant applications, and at the same time case studies raise 
basic questions. Bringing these two aspects together makes it possible for the team to 
advance. What remains is the matter of managing this process and dealing with the back-and-
forth between generic knowledge and specific cases. 
3.2. The basic activities involved in exploration: management of knowledge and 
production of probes 
 
Schön (1983, 1997) described the combination of the processes of abstract knowledge 
and action using the metaphor of a “conversation with the situation”. On the one hand, the 
designers’ knowledge enables them to formulate problems that lead to preliminary answers, 
and thus to tests and action plans. On the other hand, implementation of these action plans 
and attempts to implement these answers constitute a test that leads to new knowledge – the 
situation “responds” to the designers, often in a surprising way. The designers then make use 
of this new knowledge to shift the exploratory path towards other fields, revise the starting 
framework, or even attempt to transform the situation. In this sense, the probe, as both an 
action and a knowledge-generating event, plays a central role in the design process, a role 
different from the traditional validation of scientific statements. Hatchuel (1999) formalized 
this transactional knowledge-action process under the terms of rationalization strategies and 
“learning from doing”, explicitly taking into account the collective character of the 
investigation. 
The probe is thus the key activity in the exploratory process. Its value depends on both 
the extent to which it increases knowledge and the extent to which it constitutes an advance in 
implementation. Its importance is emphasized by researchers working on companies facing 
highly dynamic technology/market environments (Lynn, Morone and Paulson, 1996; Brown 
and Eisenhardt, 1998). A comparable emphasis can be found in the concept of an “event” in 
Zarifian (1995), with the – essential – difference that the latter highlights the fortuitous 
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dimension of chance, which is contrary to the design strategy: a surprise coming from a 
designer is – even if this expression appears paradoxical – an intentional and expected 
surprise, brought about by the overall design strategy itself.  
 
The fact remains that the “production” of probes is an organizational problem. Studies 
of the activity of research laboratories in the fields of sociology (Latour, 1989) and 
management (Charue-Duboc and Midler, 1998) reinforce our observations of the inexorable 
intermingling of the intellectual and material dimensions of research activity. On the one 
hand, it is necessary to develop a research programme (formulate a hypothesis, choose the 
tests to carry it out, etc.), to analyze the results, formally to describe the phenomena observed, 
etc. On the other, it is necessary to produce samples, conduct the tests (the supply of raw 
materials, the preparation of equipment, etc.) and carry out the calculations, etc. This second 
dimension is often neglected by stereotypes of ivory tower theoreticians. It nevertheless plays 
an essential role when the generation of knowledge mobilizes machines as sophisticated as a 
hydroforming press and, since the project is taking place amidst a sharp division of labour, 
involves the co-ordination of dispersed teams. 
Organizing a probe as part of a research programme is much more complicated than it 
might appear. First it must be set up, which involves deciding on a goal, the materials to be 
used, parameters for running the machine, and the variables measured. Then it must be 
organized, which means finding a technician and available testing equipment (knowing that 
this often involves rare resources), obtaining the supplies needed, and so on. Then comes the 
tricky stage of analysis. The researcher once again must seek out a technician, measurement 
tools, and so forth. All this can take many working hours. Moreover, this process can be 
delayed at every stage. For example, new materials needed to verify a hypothesis may not be 
immediately available; in this case, it will be necessary to modify a production schedule 
(rolling, tube production lines, etc.) on a production site that is often far away, which could 
delay the process for several weeks. 
This picture gives a sense of the difficulty of running projects for innovative upstream 
goods and services. Organizing probes to learn about innovations actually forms part of the 
client-supplier relationship. Before returning to these points in the conclusion, we will present 
the principles that could serve to underpin a system for managing these projects. 
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3.3. Principles for managing innovative upstream market supply 
 
The analysis presented above allows us to lay down certain principles to be used in 
evaluating a system for organizing innovative upstream goods and services.  
Principle 1: the specificity of the basis for evaluation 
The first step in assessing performance or implementing a strategy is to define an 
observer, that is, a reference base. We have seen that it is usually difficult to grasp the 
importance of projects for innovative goods and services using established frames of 
reference. The advantages they can bring usually lie outside existing horizons; they cut across 
the boundaries of existing markets; they have non-linear effects which are generally poorly 
understood. Evaluating the project therefore cannot be separated from creating a context that 
will serve as the project’s frame of reference. To a large extent, discussing the project 
involves discussing the advantages to be derived from this potential context and then creating 
it. 
Principle 2: the dual role of research for innovative upstream goods and services  
Every investigation (research report, customer study) associates a process of 
generating knowledge with a process of creating sales. A management scheme must thus take 
into account these two different dimensions of performance. A study could lead to new sales 
without contributing any new knowledge other than the existence of a particular market for 
the item. Conversely, a study could fail to generate any sales but produce knowledge that is 
crucial for understanding a technique or defining its potential field of application. This makes 
it possible to improve the investigation’s results upon each iteration. As knowledge 
accumulates, technical uncertainties are reduced, the tests to be conducted and the potential 
applications are more precisely known, and step by step the two dimensions converge – or the 
investigation is halted if the technique proves to be less valuable than anticipated. 
Principle 3: the centrality of testing in the management scheme 
Testing is the value-added activity par excellence for the two dimensions of performance. 
The study of the hydroforming project shows that testing takes various forms: 
- internal (feasibility, forming, assembly, productions, etc.) or external (functional 
behaviour test, mass production test) physical tests; 
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- simplified representation of the products/process under study (simulations, test 
models, etc.); 
- meetings and discussions with partners (other steel makers or suppliers) and/or 
competitors; 
- presentation and discussion of the results with the customer; 
- summaries for company personnel not involved in the project, etc. 
 
All these tests should have three features which are conducive to knowledge creation: 
1. they represent a test of the “theory in use” (Argyris and Schön, 1978) by the personnel 
involved in innovation, thus leading them to consider the relevance of their current 
research and, if necessary, to carry out new tests or even completely revise their 
understanding of phenomena involved (“double-loop learning”, ibid.). 
2. they require those involved to formalize their knowledge, to make it explicit (in the sense 
used by Nonaka, 1995) so as to present and/or evaluate it. For example, meetings with 
customers “reveal the weaknesses of studies and encourage [those involved] to seek new 
responses”11. 
3. they make it possible to mobilize the energy of everyone involved (both within and 
outside the team) for explicit, key deadlines.  
 
We believe that these tests should be the basic work unit of the management scheme. The 
intensity of learning will depend on the team’s capacity to generate, conduct and exploit a 
continuous flow of tests over a period of time. There should be an effort to accelerate the 
production of tests, even if this proves difficult (section 3.2.) 
Principle 4: the reversibility of the investigation 
Principle 4 states that the lessons learned from a given study should be able to serve in 
a different framework. Investigation is carried out in two arenas: that of user functionality and 
that of technical properties. In attempting to satisfy a specific customer demand, researchers 
may make technical discoveries that would be useful elsewhere. Discoveries resulting from 
the work on this demand could also lead to revising the initial technical hypothesis that led to 
carrying out the study. In a typical example, a search for outlets for hydroforming yields a 
solution using tailored blanks, or a study of hydroforming an item reveals that this technology 
has interesting properties that could be used on other items. The management scheme must 
enable and even promote such heuristic approaches. 
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Principle 5: giving the investigation a temporal focus 
Projects for innovative goods and services take place in an extremely dynamic 
competitive environment. Use values, strategies and technologies are changing even as they 
are being explored. Responses that are satisfactory at a given moment are no longer so a brief 
time later, since the questions are changing even as they are being studied. Handling different 
investigations sequentially thus increases the risk that a partial response at a given point will 
no longer be satisfactory once the problem’s other dimensions have been resolved. The 
project would thus be perpetually out of control. The likelihood that the project will yield 
results thus depends on the speed of exploration and the synchronization of the market-based 
and technical dimensions of the solution. 
A project should be considered as a portfolio of studies (techniques, developments 
with customers emphasizing different functions, etc.). Based on this principle, an 
investigative strategy that planned all these studies simultaneously would be much more 
valuable than one that programmed them in succession. This has echoes in the notion of 
concurrent engineering, but here the goal is not so much to shorten time-to-market (a key 
argument in developments with low uncertainty) as to increase the likelihood of success 
(desynchronizing the “technical” and “market” dimensions increases the risk they will never 
converge). As in the field of projects for “conventional” new products, the application of this 
principle generally conflicts with the logic of resource management, which seeks to smooth 
out workloads. Under this principle, a project consumes significant resources at the outset, but 
can be halted abruptly once it becomes (rapidly) certain that the innovation is not promising 
in the current context. This makes it possible to avoid projects that consume resources without 
ever showing results and wind up wearing out both researchers and their managers.  
 
4. Conclusion: towards the rationalization of projects for innovative goods and services 
 
 This article has emphasized the importance of innovation-based competition in 
upstream companies. At the same time, we have described the specific features of design 
situations in this area (Midler, 1996) and explained the principles for managing what we have 
called projects for innovative goods and services. We will conclude by showing how these 
principles can be translated into practice and what kind of obstacles will be encountered 
during implementation. Our current research, in the context of organizational experiments 
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carried out on the hydroforming project, has focused on three fields, in which we have sought 
to apply the principles set forth above: 
 
1. Managing in-house learning about the technology. We have demonstrated the often 
poorly understood importance of the “productive” aspect of research, which is often 
treated as a purely intellectual scientific activity. Saving time in this area can accelerate 
the generation of knowledge through more frequent testing of the “theory in use”. This 
takes us back to, among other things, methods for encouraging actors who are not directly 
part of the project team but whose contribution is nevertheless essential for its proper 
functioning (supplying all kinds of materials, internal “sub-contracting” of the study, etc.). 
 
2. Customer/customer-supplier relations. The cases we have had the opportunity to follow 
point up the difficulty of carrying out co-design on highly innovative subjects. Comparing 
the functioning of several studies indicates several elements that could help avoid loss of 
control in development: the existence of a temporal framework fixed ex ante, the technical 
and policy competence of company representatives, the involvement of the two parties, 
the use of simple tests to validate different search paths, etc. 
 
3. Overall management of the project. Since innovation involves bringing together a 
requirement (often latent in our cases) and technical knowledge (under development), it is 
essential that a permanent link be established between customer studies and internal 
learning about the technology. This raises organizational questions (for example, the 
existence of a project leader) but also the issue of which management tools should be used 
to monitor the various kinds of studies (internal and external), to determine the resources 
and energy needed according to an assessment of their importance, and to capitalize on 
the learning acquired about the innovation. 
 
For about ten years now, changes in the design process have been reaching new sectors 
and contexts. Each time, this process of collective learning must steer a path between two 
pitfalls:  
- the desire to copy a model that has demonstrated its excellence in a different context. 
While it is easy to transpose relatively vague managerial notions like the term “project 
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management”, in practice they generally do not stand up well to the differences in the 
new context; 
- rejection of the immensely valuable lessons learned from management sciences and 
experience, which are a relevant resource for stimulating and contributing to the 
learning needed for a creative response suitable to the situation. 
 
Since the methodology of management researchers enables them to subject their corpus of 
theory to concrete experimentation, these researchers can be useful resources for avoiding 
these two pitfalls and finding the path towards the innovation practices of tomorrow’s 
companies. The present study is one of many that take this approach. 
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